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Abstract
* 
 
The No to the euro in referendums in Denmark and Sweden has been characterized as 
a  public  rebellion  against  an  elite  project  and  a  sign  of  a  general  Euroscepticism 
among the citizens. However, it is often ignored that support for the euro fluctuates 
significantly over time in these countries, and hence analysing referendum outcomes 
simply in terms on static factors will provide only part of the explanation. In contrast 
to  existing  studies,  this  paper  provides  an  analysis  of  the  short-term  dynamics  in 
public support for the euro in the period leading up to the referendums. We thus 
address the question of why public attitudes towards monetary integration vary over 
time.  We  argue  that  at  least  part  of  the  answer  can  be  found  in  exchange  rate 
fluctuations. Existing studies have neglected the fact that the national currency is not 
only a purely monetary indicator, but also carries symbolic weight. The public is 
therefore less likely to surrender their national currency when it is strong than when it 
is weak. They are also less willing to accept a replacement currency (e.g. the euro) 
when it is seen as weak vis-à-vis other world currencies. Our analysis of the two euro 
campaigns lends credence to our proposition that exchange rates matter. Moreover, 
we test impact of exchange rate changes on support of the euro using time series 
analysis.  We  find  that  the  rapid  fall  in  the  value  of  the  euro  vis-à-vis  the  dollar 
contributed to the Danish rejection of the euro, whereas the strength of the Swedish 
currency made the Swedes more reluctant to relinquish their crown. 
                                                 
* The authors would like to thank Jonathan Beauchesne for his helpful research assistance. We are also 
grateful to Robert Klemmensen for providing us with Danish government support data.  
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Introduction 
 
The decline in the value of the euro against the dollar was the single 
most important reason why  we lost the referendum.
1 
 
(Henrik  Dam  Kristensen,  director  of  the  Danish  government’s  euro 
referendum campaign) 
 
In a world where the flows of goods, services, capital and, to a lesser extent, people 
are becoming increasingly global, the leaders of states with small, open economies are 
questioning themselves as to whether it would not be better economically to adopt a 
global currency like the US dollar or, now, the euro. In democratic countries, such a 
decision  is  unlikely  to  be  taken  lightly  given  the  important  role  that  the  national 
currency  normally  plays  as  a  symbol  of  people’s  identification  with  the  state 
(Helleiner 2003). Where the government decides that it would be best to replace the 
national  currency  with  another,  more  global  currency,  some  form  of  public 
consultation will be required in order to legitimise such a politically salient decision. 
In many cases, this public consultation will take the form of a referendum. This is 
what happened in Denmark in September 2000 and in Sweden in September 2003. 
  The issue for the government is not only to understand the economic costs and 
benefits of adopting another currency but also to gain the support of a majority of the 
population for such a decision. It is, therefore, crucial to be aware of the factors that 
influence public opinion on monetary integration. Fortunately, there is a small but 
growing  literature  on  the  topic  as  a  result  of  the  introduction  of  the  euro  in  the 
European Union (EU) in January 1999. It has focused its attention at both aggregate 
and  individual  level  determinants  of  support  for  the  European  single  currency. 
However, most of these studies have taken a static view of public opinion on the euro, 
analysing surveys at a given point in time and, hence, neglecting the dynamics of 
popular sentiments over time. Static analyses may be best to identify structural (or 
slow-changing) factors affecting people’s opinion vis-à-vis the euro’s adoption but 
they  cannot  take  into  account  those  factors  that  influence  the  evolution  of  public 
opinion on shorter time frames (e.g., over months rather than years). The short-term 
dynamics of popular support for monetary integration are important for a government 
                                                 
1 Interview by Hobolt with Henrik Dam Kristensen, Copenhagen, January 2004. All interview and 
newspaper quotes are translated by the authors.  
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that thinks adopting the euro (or the dollar) is the best decision for the country’s 
economy. As such, these short-term factors will be determinant in deciding the timing 
of a popular consultation. 
  One such factor that, surprisingly, has received little attention in the literature 
is the exchange rate. Most (static) studies speak of the importance of people’s national 
identity vs. their European one in determining the level of support for the European 
single currency. However, they neglect the fact that the national currency is also a 
symbol of the country’s identity. The question, then, is whether the symbolic value 
that people attach to the national currency is stable or variable over time. If the latter, 
then we need to understand what causes this fluctuation in value. We would argue that 
the strength of a currency, as measured by its exchange rate, is the most important 
measure of its symbolic value. Anecdotal evidence supports this view. In Canada, for 
example, support for adopting a common currency with the United States increases 
when the Canadian dollar depreciates vis-à-vis the US dollar and vice versa when it 
appreciates (Leblond 2003). In Italy, in spite of a certain degree of attachment to their 
national  currency,  Italians  were  quite  happy  to  replace  their  devalued  lira  with  a 
potentially  strong  and  stable  euro  governed  by  an  independent  European  Central 
Bank. On the other hand, Germans were reluctant to give up their Deutsche Mark 
(DM) for the euro since it had come to represent the symbol of Germany’s post-war 
stability  and  prosperity  (Risse  2003).  Thus,  the  implication  is  that  a  currency’s 
exchange rate –in both the short and long term – should be an important determinant 
of public opinion vis-à-vis monetary integration. 
  The present paper aims to validate the above-mentioned proposition regarding 
the importance of the exchange rate as a determinant of public opinion on monetary 
integration,  i.e.  replacing  the  national  currency  with  another  currency,  whether 
common (e.g., the euro) or foreign (e.g., the US dollar). For this purpose, it analyses 
the cases of Denmark and Sweden after the introduction of the euro in January 1999. 
In  opposition  to  existing  studies  –  which  are  mostly  static  single-case  or  cross-
national analyses – our focus is on the short-term dynamics of public opinion support 
for the euro in Denmark and Sweden, separately. This way, we are able to clearly 
show how the exchange rate is a key factor in explaining short-term fluctuations in 
people’s  sentiments  vis-à-vis  their  country’s  membership  in  the  Eurozone. 
Interestingly, the role of the exchange rate in influencing Danes’ and Swedes’ opinion  
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on replacing their crown differs,
2 where the former focus on the euro’s exchange rate 
with the US dollar whereas the latter focus on the krona’s exchange rate with the euro. 
This is a result of the two countries adopting different monetary policy and exchange 
rate regimes (see also Jupille and Leblang 2007). 
  The  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  The  first  section  reviews  the  existing 
literature  on  referendum  choices  and  support  for  Europe’s  single  currency.  The 
second  section  presents  our  theoretical  expectations  regarding  the  relationship 
between  exchange  rates  and  public  opinion  in  Denmark  and  Sweden.  The  third 
section describes the euro referendum campaigns in both Denmark and Sweden in 
order to show that the exchange rate was indeed a salient issue. The fourth section 
presents the data and methodology for testing the importance of the exchange rate for 
public opinion on adopting the euro while the fifth section discusses the results of the 
statistical analysis. The last section concludes on the importance that the exchange 
rate plays as a determinant of people’s support for monetary integration. 
 
 
Explaining referendum choices and support for the euro  
 
Most studies of vote choices in European referendums have focused on the individual-
level predictors of voting behaviour, rather than the dynamics of opinion formation 
over time. These individual-level approaches to voting behaviour in EU referendums 
can be divided into three schools: the ‘community’ explanation, the ‘second-order 
election’  school  and  the  ‘utilitarian  expectations’  school  (see  Garry,  Marsh  and 
Sinnott 2005; Hobolt 2006). 
The first school focuses on individuals’ values and beliefs, and argues that 
voting  behaviour  in  EU  referendums  reflects  people’s  underlying  broad  attitudes 
towards European integration. This ‘community’ approach, therefore suggests that it 
is primarily voters’ general fear about loss of sovereignty and national identity in a 
United States of Europe that drive voting in referendums (Siune et al. 1994a, 1994b; 
Svensson 1994, 2002). Another competing explanation of voting behaviour in EU 
referendums is inspired by the ‘second-order’ theory of elections (Reif and Schmitt 
1980).  The  important  characteristic  of  'second-order'  elections  (local  and  regional 
                                                 
2 Denmark’s currency is called the krone while Sweden’s is called the krona. Both names mean crown 
in English.  
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elections also fall into this category) is that they are regarded of lesser importance 
than national elections ('first-order') and, consequently, voter turnout is lower, protest-
voting and voter-switching are more common, and national issues tend to dominate 
the election campaigns. Following this logic, voters are expected to use referendums 
on European integration as a means of signalling their satisfaction or dissatisfaction 
with the government. Several studies have applied this second-order model to EU 
referendums and have linked referendum outcomes with attitudes towards national 
governments.  (Franklin,  Marsh  and  Wlezien  1994;  Franklin,  Marsh  and  McLaren 
1994; Franklin et al.1995; Franklin 2002; Garry et al. 2005).  
Finally, a third school contends that utilitarian expectations determine voting 
behaviour in EU referendums. Matthew Gabel (1998a, 1998b) has explained support 
for European integration as a function of individuals’ ability to exploit the economic 
opportunities created by market liberalization in the EU. Hence support for integration 
should  be  strongest  among  those  who  have  the  most  to  gain  economically  from 
integration (Gabel 1998a, 1998b; Gabel and Palmer 1995). According to this rational 
economic actor model, individuals who believe they will benefit economically from 
European integration will vote yes in an EU referendum, whereas people who believe 
the opposite will vote No.  
  All of these approaches to referendums can also be found in the literature that 
emerged after the Danish and Swedish referendums to explain their outcomes. 
 
Explaining euro referendum choices in Denmark and Sweden 
 
Many factors have been identified to explain the Danes’ decision with respect to the 
euro in September 2000. For instance, Marcussen and Zølner (2003) argue that a 
majority of the Danish people rejected the euro on the grounds that it was perceived to 
be  an  ‘elite’  project,  which  in  an  egalitarian  society  like  Denmark  is  something 
considered  unacceptable.  Marcussen  (2005:  51-52)  adds  further  that  the 
microeconomic  arguments  presented  by  the  government  in  favour  of  Denmark 
adopting the euro did not manage to convince a majority of the population to support 
the euro. In line with the utilitarian approach, those individuals who did believe that 
the euro would create better conditions for the Danish business community were more 
likely to vote yes in the referendum (Buch and Hansen 2002). For their part, Jupille 
and Leblang (2007) find that economic considerations did not play a significant role  
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in determining voters’ position vis-à-vis the euro. What seems to have been a key 
consideration  for  the  Danes  is  what  the  authors  call  ‘community’  issues,  notably 
national sovereignty and identity. Following the ‘community approach’, those voters 
who believed that adopting the euro would mean a loss of sovereignty for Denmark 
were, not surprisingly, more likely to have voted no in the referendum. The authors 
also found that voters who had less trust in politicians were also less likely to vote in 
favour of the euro.  
Using pre- and post-referendum surveys, de Vreese and Semetko (2004) find 
that  EU  scepticism,  government  disapproval,  economic  expectations  and  political 
ideology were significant factors in explaining voters’ choice on referendum day. The 
more people were sceptical about the EU, the more likely they were to vote no in the 
referendum (see also Buch and Hansen 2002). Moreover, in line with the second-
order explanation, the more they disapproved of the government (mostly based on 
people’s  feelings  about  the  prime  minister),  the  more  likely  they  were  to  oppose 
replacing the krone with the euro. As for economic expectations, people who had 
pessimistic expectations about their personal economic situation in the near future 
were  less  likely  to  support  the  euro.  Unlike  most  other  studies,  de  Vreese  and 
Semetko examine the impact of the campaign context on vote choices. They find that 
the news exposure significantly influences vote choices (see also de Vreese 2004). 
However, they do not examine the effect of other aspects of the campaign context, 
such as economic conditions, on opinion formation.  
As with the Danish case, several authors have tried to explain the outcome of 
the Swedish referendum on the euro. Like Marcussen and Zølner (2003) for Denmark, 
Lindahl and Naurin (2005) argue that the cleavage between the general public and the 
political elite is responsible for Swedes’ rejection of the euro in September 2003 (see 
also Widfeldt 2004). However, contrary to the situation in Denmark, they find that 
partisanship  (or  political  ideology)  did  not  matter  for  the  referendum  result. 
Interestingly, though, they say this may be because political elites were split on the 
euro issue, often within political parties.
3 Aylott (2005) even argues that this division 
amongst parties that officially advocated joining the euro is one of the main reasons 
why the no side won. He also argues that the euro-zone economies’ bad performance 
at  the  time,  especially  Germany’s,  contributed  to  convincing  a  large  portion  of 
                                                 
3 Obviously, this undermines their argument that a majority of Swedes rejected the euro because it was 
an elite-driven project.  
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Swedes that adopting the euro was not a panacea (see also Miles 2004). In addition, 
the good performance of the Swedish economy at the time convinced a large part of 
the  population  that  staying  outside  the  euro-zone  was  unlikely  to  have  dire 
consequences (Miles and Lindh 2004). In their study, Jupille and Leblang (2007) find 
that individuals who have higher human capital, as measured by the fact that they are 
business  owners  or  white  collar  workers  as  opposed  to  blue  collar  workers  or 
unemployed, are more likely to have voted yes in the referendum. Like in the case of 
Denmark,  the  authors  find  that  sovereignty  and  trust  in  politicians  are  important 
factors in determining a Swede’s vote on the euro question.  
To summarize, one of the common factors in both Denmark’s and Sweden’s 
euro  referendums  identified  by  the  literature  is  that  the  euro  was  an  elite-driven 
project  that  was  rejected  by  a  majority  of  the  population.  Preoccupations  with 
sovereignty as well as trust in politicians are also factors that were common to both 
countries’  referendums,  as  suggested  by  the  community  and  second-order 
explanations. One last point of commonality is that a large portion of people in both 
countries  felt  that  staying  outside  the  euro-zone  was  not  likely  to  have  dire 
consequences  for  their  economies,  and  hence  fell  less  compelled  by  the  general 
economic  sociotropic  arguments.  These  factors,  however,  have  been  seen  to  play 
significant role in explaining cross-national and individual support for the euro in the 
more literature on support for monetary integration in Europe. 
 
Explaining support for the euro 
Both the utilitarian approach and the ‘community’ approach have also been applied 
specifically to explaining public support for the euro. If economic considerations are 
an important determinant of general support for European integration, they should 
matter  even  more  for  policies  specifically  related  to  economic  and  monetary 
integration,  it  has  been  argued.  Following  the  rational  choice  cost-benefit  logic, 
citizens who will gain from increasing trade are likely to be more supportive of the 
euro, since monetary integration will increase trade dependence and interdependence. 
Gabel (2001), Banducci et al. (2003), Gabel and Hix (2005), and Jupille and Leblang 
(2007) find that individuals with high involvement in international trade favour the 
euro more than individuals employed in the non-tradable sector. Studies of support for 
the euro have also found that sociotropic economic concerns play a role. For example, 
Gärtner (1997) finds that citizens in countries with a looser fiscal policy and high  
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deficits are more likely to support the euro (see also Gabel 2001). Kaltenthaler and 
Anderson (2001) find that both national economic performance and national identity 
are factors influencing cross-national variation in support for the common currency. 
In general, these studies give an insight into cross-national variation in support 
for the euro, but do not examine the dynamics of public support for the euro over 
time.  An  exception  is  the  study  by  Banducci,  Karp  and  Loedel  (2003),  which 
examines public support for the euro from 1990 to 2000, using pooled Eurobarometer 
survey data. Their multilevel approach allows them to examine the effect of changing 
economic environment in individual-level support for the euro. They find that citizens 
are more willing to hand over monetary sovereignty to the European level when their 
national currency is weak vis-à-vis the dollar. Hence, they find that exchange rates 
matter, although they do not examine the value of the national currency vis-à-vis the 
euro, but rather in relation to the dollar. Moreover, they find that as national debt 
decreases, support for the euro also declines. 
Building on these studies of voting behaviour in referendums and support for 
the euro, this paper seeks to examine the particular effect of exchange rates on support 
for the euro over time. Studying vote choices as a dynamic process rather than a static 
decision is potentially very important if we want to understand the outcomes of these 
referendums. The campaign period is considered to have a greater influence on public 
opinion in referendums compared with elections, since the electoral context differs 
significantly from national elections (de Vreese and Semetko 2005; Hobolt 2005). 
Most  importantly,  referendums  are  generally  characterized  by  a  higher  degree  of 
electoral volatility. Referendum issues are often relatively unfamiliar to voters, who 
therefore do not have firm pre-existing attitudes towards the issue at stake (Franklin 
2002; LeDuc 2002). Moreover, referendums are considered to be second-order type of 
national elections with low salience and low levels of involvement (e.g., Franklin et 
al.  1994).  Party  identification  generally  matters  less  in  referendums  compared  to 
national elections, because no party name appear on the ballot and because parties 
may be internally split on the issue (Butler and Ranney, 1994; Denver 2002; Hobolt 
2007).  If  voters  know  little  about  the  specific  ballot  proposal  and  are  relatively 
unconstrained  by  predispositions  and  party  loyalties,  they  are  more  likely  to  be 
influenced by changes in the economic and political context. It has been shown in 
previous studies that there are often significant shifts in public opinion over the course 
of a referendum campaign (LeDuc 2002; Magleby 1989). Indeed, if we look at the  
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five year periods leading up to the Danish and Swedish referendums, we do find 
significant changes in vote intention.   
Figure 1 shows the development in Danish vote intention the period leading up 
to  the  referendum  on  joining  the  common  currency.  Whereas  the  number  of 
undecided  voters  remains  relatively  stable  and  low  around  10  per  cent,  there  are 
substantive shifts in the proportion of voters favourable to accession to the euro over 
the five year period. In the period before the introduction of the euro in 1999, 54 per 
cent of Danish voters are planning to vote no, but this drops to an average of just 39 
per cent in the period after the introduction of the euro. However, aggregate vote 
intention  remains  volatile  even  after  1999.  In  the  case  of  Sweden,  Figure  2  also 
illustrates a high level of volatility in vote intention. Close to half of voters were in 
favour of the euro when it was introduced in January 1999. Then support decreased 
unsteadily until 2001, only to go back up to a majority around the introduction of 
notes and coins in January 2002. Afterwards and until the referendum in September 
2003, the percentage of Swedish voters indicating that they would vote for replacing 
the krona with the euro dropped to less than 40 per cent. 
 
Figure 1  Development in vote intention in Denmark, 1994-2000 
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Figure 2  Development in vote intention in Sweden, 1999-2003 
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These  figures  thus  reveal  a  short-term  dynamics  in  the  support  for  the  euro  in 
Denmark and Sweden. In a context marked by high volatility in public opinion, it is 
important to not only examine the determinants of the final vote choices, but also 
analyse how the context shapes the development in vote intention prior to the vote.  
However,  none  of  the  studies  of  the  two  euro  campaigns  explicitly  examine  the 
development in vote intention prior to the vote, nor do most the studies on support for 
the euro examine cross-temporal variation. This study seeks to fill this gap in the 
literature by presenting a dynamic model of public support for the euro in the Danish 
and the Swedish cases, focusing on how exchange rates changes affect changes in 
opinion.  Prior  to  presenting  this  model,  we  explore  the  campaign  environment  in 
Denmark and Sweden and illustrate the saliency of the currency values in the debate. 
First, we discuss how exchange rates may influence support for monetary integration. 
 
 
Theoretical expectations: exchange rates and public opinion 
 
In Figures 1 and 2, we can observe that popular support for the euro has fluctuated 
through time. This means that the timing of the Danish and Swedish referendums  
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played a crucial role in defining the results that obtained. This is why it is important to 
understand the factors that determine the dynamics of public opinion on the European 
single currency.  
One point in common that the studies reviewed in the previous section have is 
that they are static, mainly because they are focused on explaining the outcome of a 
one-time  event  (i.e.  the  referendums).  Many  of  the  explanatory  variables  that  the 
authors identify as salient are usually fixed in the short term and change only over 
longer time periods. For example, rejection of elite-driven projects is something that 
is likely to be fairly stable through time. The same can be said about EU scepticism, 
political ideology and trust in politicians. Only two factors identified by the (Danish) 
studies  tend  to  fluctuate  over  short  periods  of  time:  government  approval  and 
economic expectations.  
Surprisingly,  none  of  the  studies  of  the  Danish  and  Swedish  referendums 
focused their attention on the role of the exchange rate in influencing the referendum 
outcomes.
4 In the introduction, we indicated that there were good reasons to think that 
the exchange rate should be an important determinant of public opinion on monetary 
integration. This is because the national currency is a symbol of national identity. And 
one  way  to  measure  the  value  of  this  symbol  is  via  the  strength  of  the  national 
currency. As mentioned in the introduction, there is anecdotal evidence from Canada 
and  Italy  that  a  weaker  (i.e.  depreciated)  currency  elicits  lower  levels  of  popular 
attachment. In the case where a currency is strong (i.e. appreciated), as in Germany, 
the population will tend to be strongly attached to it. For public opinion on monetary 
integration in general and European Monetary Union (EMU) in particular, this means 
that people in countries with weaker currencies should be more favourable to the 
adoption of another currency (e.g., the euro), ceteris paribus, than people in countries 
with stronger national currencies. Amongst the general studies of public opinion and 
EMU, only Banducci et al. (2003) include the strength of the exchange rate in their 
analysis (national currency vis-à-vis the dollar). They find that the stronger a currency 
is,  the  less  people  are  willing  to  abandon  it.  We  can  thus  formulate  our  first 
hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
4 Jupille and Leblang (2007) do base their analysis on the fact that Denmark and Sweden have different 
exchange  rate  regimes.  However,  they  are  not  concerned  with  the  role  of  the  exchange  rate  as  a 
determinant of public opinion on the euro.  
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Hypothesis #1: A stronger national currency should be associated with a lower level 
of public support for the euro. 
 
Along the same lines, it is reasonable to argue that the currency that one country is 
thinking of using as a replacement for the national currency has to be strong. After all, 
who wants to replace one weak currency by another? If a strong national currency has 
a high symbolic value, a currency of low value can equally be taken as a sign of 
weakness, both symbolically and economically. This is why the Italians had little 
qualms about replacing the lira with the euro because they considered the former to be 
weak whereas they expected the latter to be strong. In the German case, people’s 
expectations  were  somewhat  opposite.  Given  that  the  DM  had  been  the  leading 
currency in Europe for many years, Germans were not convinced that the euro would 
be as stable and strong as the DM it was meant to replace, even if the former was 
modelled on the latter. Brettschneider et al. (2003) argue that the depreciated value of 
the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar between January 1999 and the beginning of 2001 (see 
Figure 5) and its television coverage explain why Germans had a negative view of the 
euro at the time. Hence, we would also expect the public to be more reluctant to 
accept  a  replacement  currency  if  this  is  seen  to  be  weak  vis-à-vis  other  world 
currencies, irrespective of the value of the national currency. 
 
Hypothesis #2: The replacement currency (e.g., the euro) should be a strong currency 
in order to gain popular support. 
 
Now that we have identified the two hypotheses to be tested in the present study, it is 
useful  to  examine  the  extent  to  which  the  exchange  rate  was  salient  during  the 
referendum campaigns in Denmark and Sweden. 
 
 
The referendum campaigns in Denmark and Sweden 
 
The Danish referendum on the euro 
 
The Danes famously sent shockwaves though the European establishment when they 
rejected the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 by a narrow margin of 50.7 per cent. This verdict 
was reversed a year later in a second referendum on the Maastricht Treaty, but only  
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after an agreement had been reached to allow Denmark to opt out of certain policy 
areas: the single currency (final stage of the EMU), common defense, justice and home 
affairs and European citizenship. But in the late 1990s, the Danish government was 
increasingly  feeling  isolated  in  Europe  due  to  the  Danish  opt-outs.  This  spurred  a 
debate on when to have a referendum to abolish the opt-outs. After a long period where 
the polls showed a favorable public attitude towards the euro, the centre-left Danish 
government decided to call a referendum on joining the single currency in 2000. In fact, 
the  Danish  Prime  Minister  Poul  Nyrup  Rasmussen,  who  had  been  one  of  the  key 
architects behind Denmark’s conditional acceptance of the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, 
mentioned the possibility of a referendum on the euro in his New Year address in 
January 1999. He argued that it would be best for Denmark, for employment and the 
welfare society to join the euro “at some point”. A contributing factor to the timing of 
the referendum, called in early March 2000 with a referendum date of 28 September 
2000, was that the minority government, consisting of the Social Democrats and Social 
Liberals, hoped that a successful outcome in a referendum would give the government a 
much needed popularity boost prior to the general election.
5 
  When the referendum was called, it appeared that this would be a successful 
strategy. The proposal to join the euro was not only backed by the government, but also 
by all of the main opposition parties. Only the far-right party, the Danish People’s 
party,  the  far-left  parties  and  the  small  Christian  People’s  Party  were  against  the 
proposal. Moreover, the employers associations, most trade unions and 46 of 48 of 
daily newspapers came out in favour of joining the euro (Downs 2001). Denmark also 
comfortably met the economic criteria of the EMU and its economy was in cycle with 
the rest of the euro-zone. What is more, Denmark had reached an agreement with the 
European Central Bank in 1998 to participate in the new Exchange Rate Mechanism 
(ERM), which meant that the value of the Danish krone was fixed against a narrow 
band of the euro. Hence, even outside the euro-zone Denmark had little freedom to 
follow an independent monetary policy and, in that sense, little was lost economically 
by joining the euro. 
  Despite  the  strong  position  of  the  yes-side,  the  campaign  became  an  uphill 
struggle. During the very long and intensive campaign, the majority in favour of the 
euro  was  gradually  eroded.  The  government’s  key  argument  was  that  the  single 
                                                 
5 Interviews with Henrik Dam Kristensen and Niels Helveg Petersen, January 2004.  
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currency  would  stimulate  economic  growth,  fuel  employment  and  induce  economic 
stability. They also warned that interest rates would rise if Denmark did not join and 
that a No vote could lead to the loss of more than 6,000 jobs. In contrast, the no-side 
focused less on the economic aspects and more on the loss of national sovereignty and 
the threat of a political union. As the campaign director of the Danish People’s Party, 
Søren Espersen, has noted: 
 
We ran a positive campaign in favour of the crown. Our slogan was 
“The Crown and the Fatherland”. We avoided the economic aspects. 
But that is all the yes-side focused on, and that is why they lost. They 
focused too much on the economic aspects, and none of it turned out to 
be true. People no longer believed in them.
6 
 
As Espersen points out, the government’s focus on the economic logic of accession 
backfired during the campaign. First, the highly reputable Danish Economic Council 
(“The Wise Men”) published a report in May 2000, which concluded the economic 
consequences of not joining would be minimal, and that a ‘wait-and-see’ approach was 
sensible. Second, and perhaps more importantly,  the euro’s sustained and steep decline 
in value created uncertainty about the stability of this currency. The rapid fall in the 
euro  against  the  US  dollar  was  widely  reported  in  the  Danish  newspapers  and 
contributed  to  the  feeling  that  a  no-vote  may  be  safer  than  joining  a  currency  in 
freefall.
7  The no-side was quick to adopt the argument that it would be risky to adopt 
such a weak currency. Of course, the Danish currency was equally declining in value 
against the dollar, as it was pegged to the euro, but this was rarely mentioned in the 
news coverage. Instead the declining value of the euro was front-page news and subject 
to heated discussion on the debate pages from the time the euro was launched in 1999. 
The normally dull topic of exchange rates became one of the most salient issues on the 
news agenda, and the value of the euro was moved from the business section to the 
front-page. As most newspapers favoured the introduction of the euro, leader articles 
would emphasise that a weak currency did not necessarily imply that the euro-project 
was doomed to fail. Yet, in the minds of voters, the image of the plummeting currency 
was more powerful. As one of the leader articles commented: ‘The numerous news 
                                                 
6 Interview with Søren Espersen by Hobolt, January 2004. Espersen is Head of Press and 
Communication for the Danish People’s Party since 1995. He ran the party’s campaigns leading up to 
the Amsterdam and the Euro referendums.  
7 The description of newspaper coverage in this section is based on an analysis of articles in Aktuelt, 
BT, Berlingske Tidende, Ekstra Bladet, Information, Jyllandsposten, Kristeligt Dagblad, Politiken and  
Weekendavisen from January 1999 to September 2000.  
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bulletins about increases in oil prices and the euro in free fall make the Danes take one 
step back and think, “let’s wait a moment and only join when we know it is safe”’ 
(Aktuelt  2000).  Another  leader  article,  written  five  months  before  the  referendum, 
predicted: ‘the weak euro is a serious threat to the government’s ambitions on joining 
the euro. When the very symbol of the EMU is in such a serious crisis, it will be close 
to impossible to convince the Danes to vote yes’ (Information 2000). 
  In response to the declining value of the euro and the equally declining levels of 
support for joining the currency, the Danish Prime Minister attempted to appease voters 
by asserting that Denmark could join the euro and withdraw at a later stage. However, 
this argument was rendered ineffective by the President of the Commission, Romano 
Prodi,  who  responded  that  membership  of  the  euro  was  ‘by  definition  permanent’.  
Hence,  exchange  rates,  and  particularly  the  declining  value  of  the  euro  against  the 
dollar,  played  a  not  insignificant  role  in  the  Danish  referendum  campaign.  As  the 
Foreign Minister at the time, Niels Helveg Petersen, has noted: 
 
The euro referendum was not well organized by the yes-side. We made a 
number of mistakes. And the euro was in free fall against the dollar. The 
core of our argument was that the euro would create stability. The fall of 
the euro made the no-side’s argument – “Let’s wait and see” – seem 
very credible.
8 
 
The chief campaign strategist for the government, Henrik Dam Kristensen, has also 
confirmed this interpretation of events in an interview: ‘The most important factor 
leading to the decline in public support was the exchange rate between the euro and 
the  dollar.  The  euro  was  in  free  fall.  It  was  impossible  for  us  to  explain  the 
connection’.
9 
  Ultimately,  faced  with  the  option  of  choosing  to  join  a  declining  single 
currency and relinquishing a symbol of national sovereignty or a adopting a much 
safer ‘wait and see’ policy, a majority of the Danes chose to the latter. A majority of 
53.1 per cent voted no with a turnout of 87.5 per cent. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Interview with Niels Helveg Petersen. Helveg Petersen was the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs 
from 1993 until 2000, when he resigned after the Danes rejected the euro in a referendum.  
9  Interview  with  Henrik  Dam  Kristensen.  Henrik  Dam  Kristensen  was  campaign  director  of  the 
government’s campaign leading up to the referendum on the Euro in 2000.    
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The Swedish referendum on the euro 
The debate about adopting the single currency began soon after Sweden joined the EU 
in January 1995. As part of its accession agreement, Sweden was bound to enter the 
EMU once it satisfied all the (Maastricht) criteria.
10 Unlike Denmark and the UK, it 
did not have an opt-out agreement. Therefore, the Swedish government mandated an 
expert commission, led by economist Lars Calmfors, to study Sweden’s entry into the 
euro-zone from an economic and political perspective. The report was published in 
1996 (Calmfors et al. 1997). The report concluded that the economic arguments did 
not favour joining the EMU at the time, though they most probably would in the 
future. As for the political arguments, they were considered as favouring adopting the 
single currency. Hence, the government decided to adopt a wait-and-see approach. In 
October 1997, it presented a bill to the Riksdag that said that Sweden would not take 
part in the EMU on 1 January 1999, but would wait to see if the economic criteria 
identified by the Calmfors Commission would be met. Then it would consider asking 
the Swedish public whether it wanted to replace the krona with the euro. 
  Although it is only in November 2002 that Swedish Prime Minister Göran 
Persson announced that there would be a referendum on the euro on 14 September 
2003, the debate about Sweden being part of the euro-zone was alive and kicking well 
before that date. It all started with a declaration by the previously sceptical Persson in 
November 1999 that said that Sweden ‘must eventually join the euro’ (Brown-Humes 
1999). One of the main arguments used by Persson and others in favour of the euro is 
the fact that the krona had a history of weakness, whereby it would be repeatedly 
devalued  by  the  government  to  accommodate  inflation  resulting  from  a  generous 
welfare system. The depreciation of the krona vis-à-vis the euro that began in the fall 
of  2000  and  continued  in  2001  (see  Figure  4)  only  reinforced  this  point  of  view 
(Brown-Humes 2001; George 2001).  
 
The most important, I believe, is that we have got a highly weakened 
krona. Many Swedes have travelled abroad and they do not think that 
it is really nice to experience. I believe that it is the main argument for 
Swedish  membership  in  EMU  (comment  by  Göran  Persson,  TT 
2001).
11 
 
                                                 
10 The fact that Sweden allowed its currency to float against the euro made it contravene one of the 
criteria: exchange rate stability. 
11 Translation by authors.  
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The problem with this line of argument for joining the euro-zone is that the exchange 
rate between the krona and the euro switched direction around January 2002, when 
euro  notes  and  coins  were  introduced  (see  Figure  4).  As  a  result,  Prime  Minster 
Person and others in favour of replacing the krona with the euro had to resort to other 
economic arguments to make their case. For example, being part of the euro-zone 
would  increase  Sweden’s  trade  with  the  other  member-states  (see  Rose  2000).  It 
would also help decrease interest rates, which would make mortgage payments lower. 
Furthermore,  joining  the  euro-zone  would  maintain,  if  not  increase,  Sweden’s 
influence within the EU. The argument was often summed up in terms of Sweden 
being too small to make it on its own in a globalising world. 
  Opponents to the euro pointed out that Sweden’s economic performance was 
better than that of the euro-zone, where the economies of France, Germany and Italy 
were more or less stagnating and where many member-states were in breach or close 
to be in breach of the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
The No-side made frequent references to the problem of enforcing the 
Stability and Growth Pact, to the French and German refusal to abide 
by its rules, to the high unemployment rate and the low growth rate of 
the euro area, to the problems of making the EU work honestly and 
smoothly. The No-side argued that Swedes could not trust the EU to 
carry out a policy that would be beneficial to Sweden, and that Sweden 
should therefore maintain its own currency, rejecting the euro (Jonung 
2004). 
 
As such, the euro-zone was not the example of economic growth and stability that the 
yes-side was trying to put forward while Sweden was one of the star performers of the 
EU. Hence, it was easy to argue that having a flexible exchange rate regime with 
one’s own national currency was better economically for Sweden. Another argument 
that became popular amongst Swedes was that a no-vote was not irreversible whereas 
a  yes-vote  was.  Given  the  uncertainties  associated  with  the  euro-zone  economic 
performance, many people were inclined to ‘wait-and-see’, which they could do by 
voting no (Brown-Humes 2003). With the Swedish economy doing well, they could 
afford such an approach. 
  On 14 September 2003, more than 80 per cent of eligible voters took part in 
the referendum 56.1 per cent voted against the euro while 41.8 per cent voted in 
favour. It was a bitter defeat for the yes-side, which was considered as the likely 
winner when the campaign was launched 10 months before. Having decided to run  
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their  campaign  on  economic  arguments,  they  saw  most  of  them  lose  their 
argumentative power during the campaign, first and foremost the weakened krona. 
 
 
Data and Methods 
 
In this section we outline the data and models used to test the two hypotheses outlined 
above. Our dependent variable is support for joining the euro. More specifically, we 
use survey data (monthly average) on the percentage of people who would say yes in 
a referendum on the euro (as a percentage of all voters, excluding people who say 
‘don’t know’). Appendix 1 provides details on the data sources. Figure 3 shows vote 
intention  in  Denmark  and  Sweden  from  January  1999  to  January  2004.  We  have 
chosen January 1999 as the starting point for our analysis, since this is the month the 
euro was introduced.
12 There is no clear trend in either of these time series over this 5-
year period, but the two series are correlated at 0.25. Support for joining the euro is 
generally higher in Denmark than in Sweden. In Denmark, average support is 54.5 per 
cent with a standard deviation of 3.4. In Sweden, average support is 48.5 per cent with 
a higher standard deviation of 6.1. When the Danish Prime Minister first mentioned 
the euro referendum in his New Year’s speech on 1 January 1999, almost 60 per cent 
of all Danish voters who had made up their minds were in favour of the joining the 
euro (at the time 50 per cent of voters had decided to vote in favour, 34 per cent 
against and 16 per cent were still undecided). However, this had dropped to below 50 
per cent by June of 2000. Swedish support for the euro also waned after the Danish 
rejection in September 2000, but increased again from May 2001 until it peaked in 
January  2002.  This  increase  in  support  spurred  renewed  discussions  about  a 
referendum on the euro within the Swedish social democratic party. However, support 
for the euro declined in the period leading up to the referendum. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Our choice of starting point means that for Sweden we are analysing the results leading up to the 
referendum, whereas in Denmark we analyse support both before an after the referendum. Given that 
the value of the euro was made very salient in the Danish referendum campaign, we have no reason to 
believe that exchange rates would seize to have an influence on public support after the vote. Hence, 
we have include the entire five-year period in the analysis presented below, but the results are robust 
for Denmark are robust when we focus on just the period prior to the referendum.  
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Figure 3  Vote intention in Denmark and Sweden, 1999-2003 
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As  described  above,  we  are  interested  in  examining  the  effect  of  currency 
developments on support for the euro. First, we want to examine whether the strength 
of the national currency, the krone (DKK)/krona (SEK), relative to the euro has an 
effect  on  vote  intention  (hypothesis  #1).  Second,  we  are  interested  in  examining 
whether the strength of the euro relative to the US dollar has an impact on public 
opinion (hypothesis #2). In both cases, we use monthly averaged exchange rate data 
(see Appendix 1 for more details). 
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Figure 4  Crown/Euro exchange rate development 
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Figure 4 shows the exchange rate between the Swedish and the Danish Crown and the 
euro. This figure shows very little movement in the DKK/euro exchange rate, because 
the  Danish  currency  was  pegged  to  the  euro  after  January  1999.  Unlike  Sweden, 
Denmark had participated in the ERM of the European Monetary System (EMS), 
maintaining parity with the German Deutschmark since 1982 and then from 1999 with 
the euro inside the narrow ±2.25% band of ERM II.
13 The only development in the 
DKK/euro exchange rate is thus a short blip after the Danish rejection of the Euro in 
September 2000. We therefore would not expect any effect of this exchange rate on 
Danish public opinion. In contrast, there is quite substantial movement in the Swedish 
exchange rate. As described above, we expect that as the krona/euro exchange rate 
increases (i.e. the krona depreciates relative to the euro), public support for the euro 
will also increase, since a weaker national currency should find less favour with the 
population. 
  Whilst the DKK/euro exchange rate should not have any impact on Danish 
public opinion, we expect the exchange rate between the US dollar and the euro to 
have a significant effect. As described above, the plummeting value of the euro vis-à-
vis  the  dollar  came  to  symbolize  the  dangers  of  joining  this  new  currency  and 
                                                 
13 See Iversen and Thygesen (1998) for details on Denmark’s exchange rate policies since the 1970s.   
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relinquishing the Danish krone. It was also widely reported in the media. Figure 5 
shows the development in the USD/euro exchange rate.
14  
 
Figure 5  USD/Euro exchange rate development 
.
8
.
9
1
1
.
1
1
.
2
U
S
D
/
E
u
r
o
01jan1999 01jul2000 01jan2002 01jul2003
Date
 
 
 
Figure 5 clearly shows that the euro was depreciating in the 20 months leading up to 
the Danish referendum on the euro in September 2000, whereas it was increasing its 
value against the dollar in the period leading up to the Swedish referendum three 
years later.  
In addition to these exchange rate variables, we also include other economic 
control  variables  in  the  model.  First,  we  include  a  monthly  consumer  confidence 
index, which attempts to gauge consumers' feelings about the current condition of the 
economy and their expectations about the economy's future direction (see de Vreese 
and Semetko 2004). Second, we include a measure of unemployment as a percentage 
of total labour force (see Banducci et al. 2003). It measures the state of the economy 
in a way that may be easier to understand for people than GDP growth. In order to test 
the theory that referendums are fundamentally about feelings toward the government, 
we also include a ‘government support’ variable in our model (see de Vreese and 
                                                 
14 Note that a decrease in the value of the USD/euro ratio implies a weaker (i.e. depreciated) euro 
against the dollar whereas an increase means a stronger (i.e. appreciated) euro vis-à-vis the dollar.  
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Semetko 2004). This is measured as the percentage of voters who would vote for the 
governing party (Social Democrats in Sweden) or coalition of parties (in Denmark) if 
there were an election tomorrow. Following the second-order national election thesis, 
we would expect that voters are more likely to be in favour of the euro referendum 
when  they  are  also  supportive  of  the  government  and  intending  to  vote  for  the 
government. 
Since our data are time series data, we need to take into account time-series 
dependencies. Failure to attend to these dependencies is likely to lead to spurious 
results (Granger and Newbold, 1977; Ostrom, 1978). To avoid these problems, we 
rely  on  the  Box-Jenkins  model  building  procedure  of  identification-estimation-
diagnosis (Box and Jenkins, 1976).  We identify the dynamics of the input series, 
using  a  univariate  Autoregressive,  Integrated,  Moving  Average  (ARIMA)  model. 
Checking for trending, we find that both the Danish and the Swedish public opinion 
series are stationary. We find, however, that both time series are autoregressive first-
order processes. To account for this autocorrelation we include a lagged dependent 
variable. We thus use of lag of Y to model the dynamics in the data. This also makes 
substantive  sense:  public  support  for  the  euro  in  month  t  is  partly  determined  by 
public opinion in month t-1.  Finally, we perform a Q test and plot the residuals. Both 
tests confirm that the residuals are white noise. In our final tables, we also report the 
Durbin-Watson statistics, which indicate that autocorrelation is not present. 
Our  causal  argument  implies  that  the  exchange  rate  changes  come  before 
public  opinion  changes.  Moreover,  we  expect  it  to  take  some  time  for  economic 
changes to feed into public opinion. We therefore include a one-month time lag in our 
model. We can express our model in the following way: 
 
e b b b b b b + + + + + + + = - - - - - - 1 6 1 5 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 t t t t t t t Govt Unemp CCI USDEuro CrownEuro Y a Y  
 
where the parameter β1 represents the effect of the lagged dependent variable and  β2 
to β6  captures the effects of the other (lagged) independent variables on support for 
the euro, and a  is the intercept term.  
  In the next section, we discuss the results of estimating this model. 
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Results 
 
In Tables 1 and 2, we find the statistical results of our estimated model. Our two 
hypotheses concerned with the relationship between exchange rates and the public 
opinion  for  monetary  integration  are  validated.  However,  some  precisions  are 
required. 
  When  looking  at  the  results  for  Denmark  in  Table  1,  we  observe  that  the 
coefficient for the exchange rate between the krone and the euro is not statistically 
significant. Although hypothesis #1 expects this relationship to be significant, we saw 
in Figure 4 that the exchange rate between the krone and the euro is stable throughout 
the whole period under study because the krone is pegged to the euro. Therefore, as 
discussed above, we should not see any correlation between public support for the 
euro and this exchange rate. This is in line with Jupille and Leblang’s (2007) findings 
that economic calculations were not significant in determining the outcome of the 
Danish euro referendum, precisely because adopting the euro meant no real change in 
monetary policy for Denmark as the exchange rate regime would remain a fixed one 
(so little benefits for individuals exposed to international markets). In such a context, 
however, we would expect that the strength of the euro would have a strong influence 
on people’s opinion vis-à-vis adopting the euro. This is what we find in Table 1. The 
coefficient for the USD/euro exchange rate is positive and statistically significant at 
the 95 per cent level. Substantively, it means that a 0.1 increase in the exchange rate 
(i.e. Americans now have to pay 10 cents US more for one euro) is associated with a 
1.37 percentage point increase in the proportion of Danes supporting the euro (model 
3). 
  In terms of the control variables, the only one that is statistically significant is 
consumer confidence. The coefficient’s negative sign suggests that as Danes become 
more confident in their economic prospects, they are less inclined to replace the krone 
by the euro. This result is in contrast to the one obtained by de Vreese and Semetko 
(2004).  In contrast to the second-order expectation, government support does not 
have  a  significant  effect  on  public  support  for  the  euro.  This  also  contradicts the 
results obtained by de Vreese and Semetko (2004) in their study. Interestingly, when 
people in the same survey were asked whether they support the government in power, 
they also tended to be in favour of adopting the euro. However, in considering their 
aggregate behaviour over a period of almost four years, we find no relation between  
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aggregate support for the government and aggregate support for adopting the euro. 
The  same  situation  applies  to  consumer  confidence  (or  personal  economic 
expectations as de Vreese and Semetko [2004] call this factor), except that in this case 
we find a negative aggregate relation with Danish public opinion on the euro. 
 
Table 1  Support for the euro in Denmark 
 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Yes vote t-1 0.35** 0.14 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16
Crown/Euro t-1 -11.88 9.20 - - -8.84 8.98
USD/Euro t-1 - - 14.66** 6.18 13.71** 6.26
Consumer confidence t-1 -0.32* 0.18 -0.37** 0.18 -0.35* 0.18
Unemployment t-1 0.81 0.66 -0.26 0.79 -0.22 0.79
Government Support t-1 0.10 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.10 0.08
Intercept 115.63 71.35 27.51*** 7.25 95.50 69.44
Adj R Squared 0.40 0.44 0.45
DW statistics 2.18 2.10 2.09
N 57 57 57
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 
 
 
Table 2  Support for the euro in Sweden 
 
Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE Coeff. SE
Yes vote t-1 0.72*** 0.09 0.75*** 0.08 0.57*** 0.09 0.58*** 0.09
Crown/Euro t-1 6.54** 2.82 - - 9.00*** 2.71 6.08** 2.62
USD/Euro t-1 - - -19.55** 9.20 -27.86*** 8.76 - -
Crown/USD t-1 - - - - - - 2.71** 0.91
Consumer confidence t-1 0.13 0.08 -0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08
Unemployment t-1 -0.35 0.76 1.99 1.53 3.94** 1.52 3.49** 1.46
Government Support t-1 0.04 0.15 0.22 0.18 0.36** 0.17 0.34** 0.17
Intercept -46.63* 26.19 15.41** 6.81 -64.08*** 24.71 -88.68*** 28.13
Adj R Squared 0.77 0.77 0.81 0.80
DW statistics 1.79 1.83 1.86 1.86
N 56 56 56 56
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
 
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.10 
 
 
The results for Sweden differ from those obtained for Denmark. In Table 2, we can 
see that the coefficient for the krona/euro exchange rate is positive and statistically  
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significant, whether we include the USD/euro exchange rate or not in the regression. 
This confirms hypothesis #1. Substantively, the result from model 3 means that public 
support for the euro in Sweden increases by 9 percentage points when Swedes pay an 
extra krona for one euro (i.e. the krona depreciates vis-à-vis the euro). What is more 
surprising in Table 2 is the negative and statistically significant coefficient found for 
the USD/euro exchange rate. This is in direct opposition to hypothesis #2. However, it 
makes  little  sense  that  Swedes  would  be  more  favourable  to  the  euro  when  it  is 
weaker vis-à-vis the dollar, especially when they are more inclined to keep the krona 
when it is relatively strong against the euro. One way to explain this odd result is to 
look at the relationship between the krona/USD exchange rate and public support for 
the euro. In model 4 in Table 2, we can observe that the coefficient for this variable is 
both positive and statistically as well as substantively significant, even though we 
include the krona/euro exchange rate in the regression. This suggests that Swedes also 
attach some importance to their currency’s strength vis-à-vis the world’s other leading 
currency. In a sense, if one’s national currency is strong against both the dollar and 
the euro, then it is surely worth keeping; its symbolic value is high. This is also in line 
with  our  findings  of  exchange  rates  reported  in  the  Swedish  media  before  the 
referendum. This result for the krona/USD exchange rate implies that the USD/euro 
exchange  rate  result  is  only  a  statistical  artefact  that  arises  because  krona/euro  = 
krona/USD * USD/euro. If the relationship between the krona/USD exchange rate and 
public opinion for the euro is positive, then by definition the relationship between the 
USD/euro exchange rate and public support for the euro has to be negative.
15 In sum, 
we  can  conclude,  albeit  tentatively,  that  in  the  Swedish  case,  because  the  krona 
fluctuates  vis-à-vis  other  currencies,  people’s  preoccupation  is  with  the  krona’s 
strength not the euro’s. In the Danish, given that the krone was already tied to the 
euro, it makes sense to focus on the relative strength of the euro, not the krone’s. 
Again,  this  is  in  line  with  Jupille  and  Leblang’s  (2007)  finding  that  economic 
calculations in terms of giving up a flexible exchange rate regime for a fixed one were 
salient in determining voters’ choice for or against adopting the euro. 
  In terms of the control variables, we find in model 3 that coefficients for both 
unemployment and government support are statistically significant. In the latter case, 
a positive coefficient is in line with expectations (see de Vreese and Semetko 2004), 
                                                 
15 The pair-wise correlation coefficient between the two exchange rates is -0.91.  
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whereby support for the government leads to greater support for the euro. However, 
this result is not robust across the different models presented in Table 2. In the case of 
unemployment, the result obtained in model 3 suggests that popular support for the 
euro increases with unemployment, i.e. when the economic is performing less well. 
This implies that Swedes would see joining the euro-zone as a way to improve the 
country’s economic performance, ceteris paribus. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
We generally expect voters to be ill-informed and apathetic about complex and dreary 
matters such as monetary integration. Moreover, we know from previous studies of 
referendums that voters lack factual knowledge about ballot issues in referendums 
(Bowler  and  Donnovan  1998;  Hobolt  2007).  Hence,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the 
existing  literature  on  the  two  Scandinavian  euro  referendums  has  failed  to 
acknowledge the role of exchange rate in shaping public opinion. First, we do not 
expect the average voter to pay attention to, let alone have a good understanding of 
exchange  rates.  Second,  most  previous  studies  have  focused  on  explaining  vote 
choices, rather than changes in opinion formation, and hence dynamic factors, such as 
exchange rates, have not been included in the analysis. 
  Yet, our study suggests that the omission of exchange rates from the analyses 
of  the  two  euro  referendums  is  an  oversight.  People  do  not  need  encyclopaedic 
knowledge  of  monetary  policy  in  order  to  be  influenced  by  fluctuations  in  the 
exchange rate. In this paper we have argued that the value of a currency represents a 
symbolic value to many citizens. In other words, the value of a currency vis-à-vis 
other currencies is used by citizens as a cue or a heuristics as to its more general 
worth.  Whilst economist might argue that a weak currency is in fact good for exports 
and  growth,  this  is  not  the  type  of  calculation  made  by  most  citizens.  Instead,  a 
numerically strong national currency becomes a symbol of national strength, which 
citizens are less willing to relinquish. Equally, a weak ‘replacement’ currency, which 
plummets in value vis-à-vis other currencies, represents instability and frailty in the 
minds of people.  
  Our study of Danish and Swedish campaigns has shown that the symbolism of 
exchange  rate  policy  was  highly  salient.  However,  the  framing  of  the  issue  of 
exchange rates was very different in the two campaigns, due to the differences in  
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exchange  rate  regimes  and  economic  conditions.  In  Denmark,  where  the  krone  is 
pegged to the euro, the focus was on the value of the euro vis-à-vis the dollar. The 
decline  in  the  value  of  the  euro  came  to  symbolise  the  general  weakness  and 
uncertainty about the EMU project, and gave credence to the no-side’s “wait-and-see” 
argument. The free fall of the value of the euro thus undermined the argument that the 
Danes should join the euro for ‘economic reasons’.  In Sweden, where the krona floats 
against the euro and other currencies, the focus was on its value, at least originally. 
When it was depreciating against the euro, many supporters of Sweden’s participation 
in the EMU claimed that the krona’s weakness was the main reason why it should be 
replaced by the euro. However, when the krona began appreciating against the euro, 
the argument fell flat. In fact, it reinforced the no-side’s position that Sweden was 
better off economically with its own currency. 
  Our time series analyses of support for the euro from 1999 to 2003 corroborate 
these stories. In Denmark, the value of euro had significant impact on the likelihood 
of voting no. The weaker the euro against the dollar, the greater the decline in public 
support for this replacement currency. Given these result, one could argue that the 
Danish  government  (unknowingly)  chose  the  worst  possible  time  to  hold  a 
referendum on the euro, just as its value had hit rock bottom. In Sweden, it was the 
value of the national currency vis-à-vis foreign currencies that appears to have shaped 
public opinion: the stronger the krona, the lower the levels of support for replacing it 
with the euro. Interestingly, public opinion in Denmark and Sweden was not strongly 
correlated with feelings about the national government, as the second-order election 
approach  argue.  Nor  was  it  significantly  affected  by  short-term  changes  in 
unemployment rates. 
  These findings are important for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate the 
importance of analysing the dynamics of public opinion, rather than focusing solely 
on the determinants of the final vote choice. Especially in referendums, public opinion 
may be very volatile in the period leading up to the referendum. Second, they show 
that context matters, not only the immediate political context of the campaign, but 
also changes in economic conditions. Finally, the findings suggest that contrary to our 
view of the apathetic voter, public opinion may react even to complex economic cues, 
such as exchange rate changes.  
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Appendix 1: Data sources  
 
 
Support for the Euro:  
Denmark: Gallup, Sonar, Greens, IFKA, Megafon, Vilstrup, GfK, Eurobarometer. 
Sweden: Demoskop, TEMO, SIFO, Gallup 
 
Support for the Government: 
Denmark: Gallup Denmark  
Sweden: Demoskop, TEMO 
 
Exchange rate data: 
Danmarks Nationalbank (http://www.nationalbanken.dk) 
Sveriges Riksbank (http://www.riksbank.com) 
 
Unemployment data: 
Statistics Denmark (http://www.statbank.dk) 
Statistiska centralbyran (http://www.scb.se/AM0401-EN) 
 
Consumer Confidence Index: 
Statistics Denmark (http://www.statbank.dk) 
Konjunkturinstitutet (National Institute of Economic Research) (http://www.konj.se/) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 